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FHVE LESSONS FOR PRACTICING LAW IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
Fred C. Zacharias*
I entered law school prepared to change the world for the better.
The Civil Rights era in the United States, during which I was raised,
had taught us that law was the prime tool for social evolution.
Contrary to many of my classmates, I held firm to my desire to
"practice in the interests of justice."' I became a criminal defense and
then a public interest litigator.
By the time I entered academia in the next decade, my perspective
had matured. Foundation support for public interest law had eroded
to virtual insignificance. Republican appointees to the bench stood
squarely opposed to the use of law for societal change. Corporate
America2 and the Reagan Administration 3 had proven beyond a
shadow of a doubt that legal institutions developed for progressive
reform can be used in the opposite direction as well.
In short, I had learned the first two lessons of lawyering for justice.
First, law is not inherently good or evil. It is what we make of it,
individually and collectively. Second, and far more significantly, I
learned that we lawyers-even well-meaning lawyers-must accept
our own insignificance. There is only so much that most of us can
hope to do, through our practice, to bring about justice.

* Herzog Research Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. B.A. 1974,
Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1977, Yale Law School; LLM. 1981, Georgetown
University Law Center. The author thanks Professor Shaun Martin for his helpful
comments and the University of San Diego School of Law for its research support.
1. This paper responds to a question posed to symposium participants, "What
does it mean to practice law in the interests of justice in the twenty-first century?"
The question itself is predicated on the title of Deborah Rhode's recent book, to
which I respond in the latter half of this paper. Deborah L Rhode, In the Interests of
Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession (2000).
2. Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 1303, 1321-25 (1995) (describing corporate America's use and
transformation of developments that occurred in litigation as a result of liberal
Warren Court decisions).
3. See, e.g., Wash. Council of Lawyers, Reagan Civil Rights: The First Twenty
Months (1982) (identifying changes in the goals of the affirmative litigation offices of
the U.S. Department of Justice in the Reagan administration), edited version in
Robert Plotkin, Reagan Civil Rights: The First Twenty Months, 1 N.Y.L. Sch. Hum.
Rts. Ann. 117 (1983).
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Along the route to this understanding, I learned several other
lessons. The dream of every young criminal defense lawyer is to
champion the rights of falsely accused suspects. One cannot practice
criminal law without accepting that one's everyday function is not to
defend the innocent. In most criminal cases, innocence is not even in
question.
Once defense lawyers accept their own "insignificance" in the grand
scheme, they learn to focus on the little things. Achieving justice for
one's client, as opposed to achieving justice in the global sense,
becomes the core. This justice does not necessarily mean exoneration
of clients, nor does it ordinarily run counter to societal interests.
Defendants and their actions reflect shades of guilt, responsibility, and
need for punishment. For the lawyer, the quest for client justice
requires doing the small things: obtaining information that might
justify release on bail; finding diversion and sentencing alternatives;
arranging incarceration in a location close to family. My rule of
thumb-my third lesson for practicing law in the interests of justicebecame an extension of the lesson of insignificance: a lawyer should
strive to do at least one thing to improve the lot of each client that
other lawyers might not do.
When one practices in an adversarial system-and I have no
expectation that America will scrap the adversarial system anytime in
the near future-I think that one has to accept most of Monroe
Freedman's premises
It would be nice to believe that we can
reconcile societal good with client interests, but that simply is not
always possible. As a result, we need to rely on the legal system, at
least to some extent, to rein in some of the worst results that our
activities might produce.' At root, for any system based on partisan
advocacy to work, the lawyer's core job is to ally himself with his
clients. It is to give effect to clients' autonomy by helping them make
choices within the legal system. These premises hold true 6within the
paradigm of criminal litigation and in other contexts as well.

4. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 123
(1990) (justifying a strong partisan position by advocates in the adversary system);
Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System 3-6 (1975) (discussing

reasons for the lawyer's "obligation" to impose barriers to the discovery of truth);
Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalismin the American Adversary System, 41 Emory

L.J. 467, 470 (1992) (defining professionalism as serving client ends and assuming that
"the fact that the lawyer is earning a living through the legal profession is
immaterial").

5. One example from the criminal context is the obtaining of acquittals of truly
guilty and dangerous defendants.
6. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional
Responsibility, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 165, 182-84 (1996) (questioning common
distinctions between civil and criminal settings for purposes of professional

responsibility analysis); cf Rhode, supra note 1, at 51 ("The degree of partisanship
appropriate for criminal proceedings is not necessarily justifiable for civil litigation.").
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But the need for some partisanship does not mean, to paraphrase
Lord Brougham's words, that the lawyer must "know no one other
than his client."7 What drove me from the practice of law into
academia was an incident that exemplified the failure of lawyers to
recognize their own responsibility for client actions that harm others.
My firm represented dissidents of a labor union that we alleged had
become infiltrated and controlled by organized crime. At an early
deposition, one of our main witnesses, an honest union vice-president,
testified to our surprise that he had never met with us, had never told
us of corruption in the union, and, in sum, knew nothing relevant to
the case except that he had found a dead pigeon inside his locked car.
What disturbed me so much was not that our witness had been
scared into pejuring himself. Given the nature of the case, we were
prepared for the possibility that such events might occur. I was,
however, horrified to observe the attorneys for the union officersmembers of one of Washington, D.C.'s most revered law firmslaughing at the deposition testimony and slapping themselves on the
back for their good fortune. There was no doubt they knew what had
happened (though I have no reason to believe they had participated in
the wrongdoing), and they were happy about the events.
Soon thereafter, I packed up my bags-disillusioned with lawyers
and the practice of law, and armed with my fourth lesson. As
insignificant as lawyers may be, as limited as their functions
sometimes are, the extreme extension of Monroe Freedman's
paradigm is wrong.' Lawyers do bear at least some responsibility for
actions of their clients that are unambiguously wrong or injurious to
others. 9 I entered academia as idealistically as I entered law school,
firm in my intent to pass on these lessons to students and to include in
my writings suggestions that lawyers are not, and should not be, pure
hired guns.
This self-indulgent history brings me to the question of this
conference: What does it mean to "practice law in the interests of
justice in the twenty-first century?" The four lessons that I have
mentioned should make my initial reactions to the question obvious.
For most lawyers, it would be a mistake to accept the question on its
7. See 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightengale ed., 1821) quoted in Stephen
Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers 17 (5th ed. 1998) ("[a lawyer] knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client").
8. Here, I do not refer to Monroe Freedman's actual position, for he is careful to
note that lawyers have a responsibility to engage in moral dialogue with clients and to
consider initially whether to accept representation. Instead, I refer to the total client
orientation, without regard to societal and third-parly interests, which many
practitioners adhere to when implementing Freedman's teachings.
9. Of course, if one assumes that the lawyers in the union dissident case did not
participate in the wrongdoing, my conclusion that they bore personal responsibility
does not necessarily follow. My view, however, is that they were in a position, both
before and after the fact, to do something about their clients' conduct and that, in
closing their eyes to the problem, they fell short in a moral sense.
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broadest terms. Although there are exceptions, attorneys engaged in
the ordinary practice of law should not overemphasize their own
significance. They should not think of their practice as an instrument
for changing society in more than an incremental way. 10 As
representatives of individual clients, lawyers must think first in terms
of "justice" for their clients, which may simply involve obtaining
maximally-fair treatment given the client's situation. Where the
"interests of justice" issue does have special meaning, however, is with
respect to the fourth lesson. Lawyers should implement their ordinary
role in a way that acknowledges their personal responsibility for the
results the representation is trying to achieve.
I will not spend time repeating my previous writings that suggest
ways for lawyers to implement this responsibility. Suffice it to say that
the common view that professional conduct requires lawyers always to
act in an ultra-partisan, ultra-aggressive fashion simply is wrong.
More importantly, as Ted Schneyer and I both have observed," it is
not necessary to trash existing professional standards to sanction
tamer lawyering "in the public interest." The current codes already
allow it.
Lawyers have more influence on the conduct of lawsuits than they
are ready to admit. They can refuse cases.12 They can limit the scope
of representation. 13 Many nonlitigation settings do not fit the
paradigm of partisan advocacy upon which the codes are based; 4
lawyers are relatively free to adjust their approach to a case by
10. Of course, I do not mean to downplay other ways lawyers can seek to do good

that have been identified in the literature by numerous commentators-including
providing free services to indigent clients, participating in law reform activities,
devoting themselves to public service, and avoiding representation of causes with
which they disagree. My focus in this paper, however, is on the meaning of practicing
law in the interests of justice in the everyday context of lawyers' activities when
representing clients.
11. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal
Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1529, 1531-32 (criticizing the overemphasis of some scholars
on the tension between role-differentiation and moral practice); Zacharias, supra note

2, at 1327 (discussing the moral discretion of lawyers that is incorporated into existing
codes of conduct).
12. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil:
Client Selection and Cooperation with Evil, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1339 (1998)
(discussing the relevance of religious beliefs to client selection); Jennifer Tetenbaum
Miller, Note, Free Exercise v. Legal Ethics: Can a Religious Lawyer Discriminatein
Choosing Clients? 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 161, 182 (1999) (discussing religion and
client selection issues).
13. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 1.2(c) (1983) (allowing lawyers and
clients to limit the scope of representation); see generally Fred C. Zacharias, Limited
PerformanceAgreements: Should Clients Get What They Pay For?, 11 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 915, 926-27 (1998) (discussing the extent of lawyers' ability to limit
representation and the appropriate scope of regulation of that ability).
14. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 169 (1997) (discussing the appropriateness of treating different categories of
lawyers and practice differently for purposes of professional regulation).
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advance agreement with the client." Once a case begins, attorneys
have broad discretion in the actual implementation of
representation.16 Even with respect to aspects that clients control,
lawyers can encourage clients to act in an appropriate fashion. 7 For
as many types of conduct as the codes require of lawyers, there are
more instances in which the codes impose permissive duties to serve
societal interests or in which
the codes grant lawyers ultimate
8
decisionmaking discretion.1
The lingering problem, as I have suggested elsewhere 9 and as
Deborah Rhode recognizes in her book,' is that lawyers' personal
incentives often lead them to ignore the option of practicing "in the
interests of justice." An attorney who relies upon a stretched version
of Monroe Freedman's paradigm can, without losing any sleep, take
on unseemly cases and maximize his own fees simply by focusing
exclusively on the client's financial or liberty interests. That lawyer
can avoid discussing moral issues with clients. Moral dialogue is
uncomfortable; it might disappoint the client or confuse the
relationship. The lawyer also can assume that the client has no
interest in being fair to the other side or to third parties-a callous
and often counter-factual assumption, but one which ultimately
enhances the lawyer's fee-generating capability and reputation for
success (which tends to correspond to the size of his clients'
recoveries). The lawyer can interpret permissive obligations in the
codes-such as the occasional duties to disclose confidences2 ' and to
15. See Zacharias, supra note 13, at 921-26 (discussing limits placed by the
professional codes on lawyers' ability to confine representation).
16. For example, with some limits, the professional codes vest lawyers with the
right to determine the means of, or tactics used in, the representation. Eg., Model
Rules R. 1.2(a).
17. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L Rev. 1469, 1478 (1966)
(discussing a lawyer's obligation to discuss a client's desire to commit perjury); Robert
P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 Hofstra L Rev. 311, 316-17
(1990) (same); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities,1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 630-32 (noting the
lawyer's obligation to engage in moral dialogues with clients); Thomas L Shaffer, The
Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 Notre Dame L Rev. 231 (1979) (same);
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 132-33 (advocating that lawyers engage in moral
dialogues, but assuming that traditional legal ethics calls for such conversations);
Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1357-62 (discussing the possibility of codifying a lawyer's
duty to engage in moral dialogue).
1& See Fred C. Zacharias & Shaun Martin, Coaching Witnesses, 87 Ky. LJ. 1001,
1008 (1999) (discussing rules that give lawyers choices in selecting whether to use
particular types of evidence).
19. Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1331-49 (discussing lawyers' incentives to misuse
moral discretion granted under the professional codes); Fred C Zacharias, Waiving
Conflicts of Interest, 108 Yale LJ. 407, 433 (1998) (discussing lawyers' incentives to
misapply conflict-of-interest waiver provisions).
20. Rhode, supra note 1, at 3, 13,16.
21. E.g., Model Rules R. 1.6(b)(1).
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avoid using questionable evidence-in light of client interests instead
of the third-party interests that the duties are designed to protect.
The challenge for lawyers and professional regulation in the twentyfirst century is to counteract lawyers' natural incentives. I doubt that
practicing law in the interests of justice in the twenty-first century will
be much different than practicing law in the interests of justice in the
twentieth.' The right and moral duty to practice justly has always
existed. But as law practice becomes more business-oriented and
regulated more on an economic basis24 and as the provision of legal
services becomes more tiered on a class basis,25 the pressures on
lawyers to succumb to personal psychological and financial incentives
likely will increase. This is the phenomenon to which the future will
need to react.
Which brings me to Deborah Rhode's most recent offering, her
book In the Interests of Justice.26 Much of the book addresses
different, and broader, issues than the one I take to be the assignment
of this conference. The differences between Professor Rhode and
myself are not a function of age, for we were classmates in law school.
Rather, I think they are products of our experiences, which have
helped shape our perspectives. Professor Rhode has spent her long,
illustrious career in academia, analyzing the big picture; I started my
career by immersing myself in the nuts and bolts of practice. Thus her
book, in large part, presents a thoughtful look from the outside at how
the legal profession as a whole should be reformed,27 how the role of
lawyers should be redefined (both as a professional norm and in terms
of the basic tenets of the professional codes), 28 and how legal services
can be provided to a broader class of clients in the twenty-first
22. E.g., Id. R. 3.3(c); see also Zacharias & Martin, supra note 18, at 1009
(discussing implementation of Model Rule 3.3(c)).
23. In making this observation, I of course do not mean to suggest that the
practice and regulation of law itself will not change. See generally Fred C. Zacharias,
The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions and
False Paradigmsin Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2002)
(offering predictions about the future shape of the legal profession and its regulation).
24. Id.
25. One can envision a variety of future phenomena based on current trends, but
this is not the place to discuss them. They include the unbundling of legal services,
the opening of the practice of some aspects of law to nonlawyers, the likelihood that
government will become more involved in subsidized legal services for the poor and
middle class, and the further development of legal insurance and legal plans
developed along the lines of managed health care. All of these eventualities carry
with them increased competition among lawyers and the prospect that the quality of
services received will depend heavily on the ability to pay. See Rhode, supra note 1, at
2 (discussing the increasing gap in legal representation between the rich and poor).
26. Rhode, supra note 1.
27. Indeed, the subtitle of the book is "Reforming the Legal Profession," which
leads Rhode to consider such megaquestions as the professional pressures on lawyers,
id. at 23-48, the value of the adversary system itself, id. at 49-80, the role of law, id. at
117-35, and the role of legal education. Id. at 185-203.
28. Id. at 66-70, 143-68.
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century.29 My comments address the far narrower and more personal
question that well-meaning lawyers face every day; namely, how can a
lawyer reconcile his day-to-day activities with the notion that the
purpose of law is, at some level, to achieve justice.
Rhode does, of course, devote considerable attention to the narrow
question as well, just as my two decades of experience as an academic
often drives me to consider the structural issues. In the end, the foci
of the works we have presented to this conference merge in one
important respect. With one exception, neither of us is concerned in
our work with the big social picture-the way in which lawyers can, in
my words, "change the world."' 3 Rhode does address the problem of
the provision of legal services 31 and she is correct that changes need to
be made.32 To the extent we are discussing the actual "practice of law
in the interests of justice," however, we both concern ourselves with
how lawyers should constrain their personal conduct in their legal
activities.
And in our responses to this issue, we share far more agreement
than disagreement. Most importantly, we concur on the root cause of
the problem; namely, that the combination of the psychological
comfort zone of lawyers and their economic incentives leads lawyers
to misinterpret or abuse the role they are assigned by the professional
codes.33 Most state standards give lawyers leeway to exercise
considerable moral discretion to take "the interests of justice" into
account, but lawyers often avoid exercising that discretion.'
29. Id. at 131-41.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
31. Rhode, supra note 1, at 131-41.
32. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reply to Hyntan and Silver: Clients Should Not Get

Less Than They Deserve, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 981, 984 (1998) (discussing the need
for some unbundling of legal services and for opening the door to nonlawyer

practitioners). Although I agree with Rhode on the basic premise that lawyers should

not interfere with the provision of less expensive competitive services, I am not sure
that I agree with her apparent view that lawyers have a special obligation-i.e, one

greater than that of any other privileged service provider-to provide pro bono
services. Rhode, supra note 1, at 45-47.

In my view, that is a personal moral

obligation lawyers share with many others, and with the tax-bearing society at large.

33. Rhode, supra note 1, at 13 (noting "two central conflicts: the tensions between
lawyers' economic and noneconomic interests, and the tensions between professional

and public interests"); Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1327-50 (discussing the incentives of
lawyers in a variety of contexts); cf.Rhode, supra note 1, at 2 ("[N]o matter how well

intentioned, lawyers regulating lawyers cannot escape the economic, psychological,

and political constraints of their position.").
34. Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1328; see also Schneyer, supra note 11, at 1531.
Professor Rhode acknowledges this reality, Rhode, supra note 1,at 67, but seems

ambivalent about it:
Over the last century, the bar's codes of conduct have progressively
narrowed the ethical discretion that lawyers are expected to exercise once

they have accepted representation.... In effect, an attorney's obligation is
to defend, not judge, the client. Under this standard view, good ethics and
good business are in happy coincidence.
Rhode, supra note 1, at 15.
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To some extent, we differ on the ramifications of that conclusion.
Rhode seems to call for a basic reformulation of the lawyer's roleboth in the consciousness of lawyers and in professional regulation.35
She seems to call for a redirection of the codes.36 Like me, she is
dissatisfied with the status quo, but she demands major, global change.
Driven by my lesson of insignificance, I am less convinced that such
changes are capable of being achieved. Nor am I sure that they are
even necessary. For purposes of regulation, I would favor, instead,
the development of concrete mechanisms to counteract lawyers' venal
incentives and to forcefully educate lawyers and the public concerning
the role lawyers can (and cannot) and should (and should not)
individually play in pursuing justice. 7 That may in fact be what
Professor Rhode really is suggesting, because she recognizes the
difficulty and costs inherent in reforming the whole system. 8 In any
event, I doubt she would disagree with the steps that I advocate,
though she may well wish to go further.
At root, I think, the differences that we do have reflect Professor
Rhode's sharp, though limited, 9 disapproval of the adversary
systemn'-a position she shares with many academics.4 While I have
35. Rhode, supra note 1, at 2, 16 (calling for "structural reform" in professional
regulation and noting that "[t]he central premise of this book is that the public's
interest has played too little part in determining professional responsibilities"). The
book is somewhat ambiguous on whether Professor Rhode expects change to come
through regulation requiring change or simply through better understanding on the
part of lawyers. Despite otherwise strong language condemning lawyers' failure to
accept responsibility for third party interests, by recognizing the existence of "hard
cases" in which lawyers might need to subordinate third party interests to selfish
client interests, Rhode seems to suggest that the answer must rely on a flexible
application of lawyer discretion. Id. at 71-80; cf William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion
in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1088-91 (1988) (advocating a flexible approach
in which lawyers are free to exercise "moral discretion").
36. Rhode, supra note 1, at 21 (calling for "more specific and more demanding
standards"). Indeed, Rhode goes further to call for regulation by presumably outside
regulators who are less "self-interested" than the bar and will thus provide "public
accountability for professional regulation." Id. at 19.
37. See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1351-77 (describing a few possible regulatory
responses).
38. Rhode, supra note 1, at 51, 71 (recognizing "hard cases" and arguing for
reform, rather than abolition of the adversary system).
39. Ultimately, Professor Rhode would not abandon the adversary system, but
simply argues-correctly I think-that the "commitment to partisanship has its
limits." Id. at 74. Accordingly, she argues for a "contextual moral framework." Id. at
79.
40. Id. at 50 (arguing that, "[i]n many contexts, the moral justifications for zealous
advocacy are unconvincing" and that the adversary model, when combined with
lawyers' personal incentives, produces "a professional role that compromises public
interests"); cf. id. at 51-66 ("Any socially defensible conception of the advocate's role
will require more ethically demanding professional codes and institutionalized
practices.").
41. See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer:
Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 83, 89-90 (David Luban ed., 1983) (identifying
the tension between role-differentiated conduct and morality and questioning at least
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no abiding affection for the way the system often is implemented,42 I
am not prepared to debunk it to the same degree as Professor Rhode,
at least not until we find a better systemic alternative. As Rhode
seems to acknowledge
in her discussion of "hard cases," no one has
3
yet done so
Once we commit lawyers to the task of representing client interests,
I despair of incorporating a free-standing secondary role that requires
lawyers to focus on protecting third-parties. 4' But I have not lost all
the idealism that I possessed as a young man. I believe that becoming
Rhode's paradigm-the lawyer who acts morally responsible despite
personal incentives 45-is not only permissible within the existing
professional norms, but also possible. The keys to my vision are two:
first, a trust that lawyers are capable of exercising self-restraint, given
the realities of their job; second, a belief that realistic regulators can
develop institutional structures to foster lawyer objectivity and to help
lawyers overcome the sense that the system and their role require
them to act amorally.
Thus, in the end, Professor Rhode and I fully agree on the narrow
question of what it means to practice in the interests of justice.
Lawyers must take responsibility for their own actions, particularly
their participation in actions that hurt others. Taking responsibility
involves recognizing that the adversary system does not require
blindness to moral issues. It simply requires lawyers to take systemic
considerations into account in determining what conduct is moral.46
Thus, a responsible lawyer must be willing to remain objective,
exercise that discretion which he has, attempt to influence conduct by
clients or others that seems improper, and limit his willingness to
engage in representation that is likely to bring his personal and
professional morality into conflict. I am sure that all professional
the current operation of the adversary system).
42- See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L Rev. 351,
363-67 (1989) (questioning some of the traditional premises of attorney-client
confidentiality and the adversary system).
43. Rhode, supra note 1, at 72-73 (noting that while "restraints on advocacy seem
reasonable in theory, they are likely to prove deeply problematic in practice....
Proposals to curtail advocacy for criminal defendants.. . risk reinforcing the practical
pressures that already work against effective assistance of counsel").

44. Cf. id. at 18 ("Lawyers have a responsibility to prevent unnecessary harm to
third parties, to promote a just and efficient legal system, and to respect core values
such as honesty, fairness, and good faith on which that system depends.").
45. Id. at 17 (calling for "lawyers to accept personal moral responsibility for the
consequences of their professional acts").

46. See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1327-28 (arguing that "role-differentiation is
consistent with objective moral decisionmaking. It simply requires lawyers to order

their conduct with a view to the effects of the conduct on the legal system."); cf
Rhode, supra note 1, at 67 ("Attorneys should make decisions as advocates in the
same way that morally reflective individuals make any ethical decision. Lawyers'

conduct should be justifiable under consistent, disinterested, and generalizable
principles.").

1948

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

responsibility teachers inform their students that "legal ethics" as
portrayed in the professional codes does not represent morality in any
traditional sense. Lawyers must be prepared to reconcile the two.
Let me finish with a fifth, and final, lesson that I learned from
practice. In Professor Rhode's analysis, and occasionally in that of
mine and others as well, the notion of client orientation as a
paramount principle has taken a pounding. But none of us mean to
suggest, I think, that helping clients is a bad thing. My experience as a
lawyer and the process of incorporating the lesson of my own
insignificance highlighted for me the importance of remembering the
human aspects of representing clients, including guilty ones.
One of my fondest memories as a practitioner is of representing
prisoners in post-conviction matters. Unlike in any other area of my
practice, these clients appreciated my efforts on their behalf-despite
the fact that I typically accomplished less for them than for my other
clients and often told them there was nothing I could do. Why? I
suspect it was because I was one of the few people in their lives who
treated them with respect and took their concerns seriously. What I
learned was that Monroe Freedman's paradigm is right in its essence:
individuals enmeshed in the legal system-by their own choosing or
otherwise -may not deserve to win, but they have legitimate fears and
worries that need to be addressed. Lawyers are the system's conduits
for providing that attention.
The lesson? Justice exists on a small and human level. So long as
law involves individual clients and adversaries,4 7 practicing law in the
interests of justice in the twenty-first century-as in past centurieswill require lawyers to remember the humanity of their calling. It is
the job of academics and those who set the profession's standards to
both remind and persuade lawyers of that essential fact.

47. Cf. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 188 (arguing that the professional norms of
behavior should, perhaps, vary for different clients and contexts).

